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BRUYLANT
LIMITS TO EU LOYALTY
By
Timothy ROES*
In 2011, a few months after the judgment in Commission v. Sweden, (1) 
an article in the European Law Review wondered whether Member States’ 
duty of loyalty in external relations was indeed as limitless as the judgment 
seemed to say it was. (2) Anyone vaguely familiar with the principle is 
bound to have similar concerns with regard to the principle’s application 
outside the area of external relations. A striking number of the Court’s land-
mark judgments — from Costa v. ENEL, over Factortame and Francovich 
to Courage v. Crehan — have loyalty as their only or principal foundation.
Surprisingly, studies tracing the boundaries of Article 4(3) are few and 
far between. Scholarly scrutiny of the Court’s activism has rarely extended 
to the Court’s reliance on what is now Article 4(3) TEU. In 2008, however, 
John Temple Lang produced a helpful list of general restrictions emerg-
ing from the case law. Kirstin Reuter’s 2013 doctoral dissertation (hitherto 
unpublished) has examined what limits conferral poses to Member States’ 
loyalty duty in external relations. (3)
Hoping to make loyalty less of a thought-terminating cliché in legal 
argumentation, this paper revisits the case law and the changes brought by 
the Lisbon Treaty and argues that loyalty is far from limitless. It makes a 
four-fold argument.
First, it examines what constraints flow from the text of Article 4(3) 
and from its place in the TEU. The paper submits that the provision gives 
the Court a broad mandate to determine what duties flow, for the Member 
States, from the objectives of the Treaties, but that it leaves the Court less 
freedom when this would result in positive obligations, rather than mere 
“negative” duties of abstention. Moreover, its placing by the Lisbon Treaty 
highlights that, more than ever before, it ought to be construed with respect 
for the Member States’ national identity as well as in keeping with the 
principles of conferral, proportionality and subsidiarity.
 * KU Leuven/New York University, timothy.roes@law.kuleuven.be
 (1) Judgment in Commission v. Sweden (“PFOS”), C-246/07, EU:C:2010:203.
 (2) A. DelGaDo casTeleiro and J. LariK, The duty to remain silent : limitless loyalty 
in EU external relations ?, 2011, 36 ELR 524.
 (3) K. ReuTer, Competence Creep via the Duty of Loyalty ?: Article 4(3) TEU and its 
Changing Role in EU External Relations (unpublished PhD thesis, European University 
Institute, 2013).
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Second, the paper looks at the ways in which the Court has “tied itself to 
the mast” in its application of the loyalty principle. The Court has generally 
stuck to the text of Article 4(3) (or its predecessors), rather than to rely 
on the unwritten general principle of which the Treaty provision is merely 
the expression. The Court moreover has shown deference to the political 
branches by repeatedly making clear that Article 4(3) is of a residual nature, 
which means that loyalty only becomes relevant when there are no other, 
more specific rules governing the situation at hand. (4) Even then, loyalty 
cannot create wholly new obligations, according to the Court. For instance, 
while Article 4(3) TEU precludes Member States from facilitating anti-
competitive behaviour prohibited by Articles 101-102 TFEU, the Court 
takes pains to stress that the latter provisions only apply to undertakings, 
not Member States. (5) Finally, the Court has held that the principle is inher-
ently mutual, which means that it also imposes obligations on the Union 
institutions, not only towards the Member States but towards one another 
as well. (6)
Third, the paper argues that other general principles of Union law have 
informed and constrained the Court’s use of Article 4(3). In particular, it 
explores (i) how the principles of conferral, proportionality, subsidiarity 
and legal certainty have attenuated full-throttle effectiveness, and (ii) how 
fundamental rights have created an exception to the loyalty-based obligation 
of mutual trust between the Member States.
That conferral ought to soften loyalty’s bite appears for instance in the 
line of case law on the limits to national procedural autonomy, starting 
with Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Comet. (7) While Article 4(3) requires national 
courts to ensure the effective judicial protection of the rights that individu-
als derive from Union law, loyalty can only require so much from national 
courts before it impinges on a competence that belongs to the Member 
States — something which the Court repeats to this day. Thus, all loyalty 
requires is that the judicial protection of EU rights is equivalent to that of 
national rights and that national procedural law does not make it ‘virtually 
impossible or excessively difficult’ to enforce them — a standard that does 
not entail full effectiveness.
 (4) Judgment in Compagnie Commerciale de l’Ouest, C-78 to 83/90, EU:C:1992:118, 
para. 19.
 (5) Judgments in GB-Inno-BM, 13/77, EU:C:1977:185 ; Asjes and Others, 209 to 
213/84, EU:C:1986:188.
 (6) Judgment in Luxembourg v. European Parliament, 230/81, EU:C:1983:32, para. 37.
 (7) Judgments in Rewe-Zentralfinanz, 33/76, EU:C:1976:188 ; Comet, 45/76, 
EU:C:1976:191.
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The principle of proportionality, too, puts limits on effectiveness. For 
instance, following Commission v. Greece, Article 4(3) requires Member 
States to adopt sanctions to enforce EU law when secondary EU law does 
not itself provide for them. These sanctions, however, not only need to be 
effective and dissuasive but must also be proportionate. (8)
The principle of subsidiarity appears less relevant to the limitation 
of loyalty in the Union’s internal affairs. Externally, however, the Court 
does sometimes question the necessity of an ERTA- (and thus loyalty-) 
based external action. (9) Some authors have called this an expression of 
subsidiarity. (10)
The principle of legal certainty, too, creates an important limit to loyalty. 
For instance, in Kühne & Heitz the Court was quick to point out that Arti-
cle 4(3) does not go so far as to require any administrative body to review 
administrative decisions that have become final but, in light of later case 
law of the Court, seem to violate EU law. (11) Expressing concern for legal 
certainty, the Court thus established four cumulative conditions that must be 
met before such a duty arises. Another example is Winner Wetten, in which 
the Court left open the possibility that “overriding considerations of legal 
certainty involving all the interests, public as well as private” could justify 
temporarily maintaining a national measure violating Union law in order to 
prevent a legal vacuum. (12)
Fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of 
Union law and, they too, have occasionally limited loyalty. Article 4(3) 
TEU is the basis for the obligation of mutual trust between the Member 
States, which is central not only to the internal market but also to the EU 
asylum system (the Dublin Regulation). In N.S.,  (13) however, the Court 
provided for an exception to the duty of mutual trust in light of the ECHR 
and the earlier judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece. (14) Thus, where a Member State “cannot be unaware 
 (8) Judgment in Commission v. Greece, 68/88, EU:C:1989:339, para. 24.
 (9) See in particular the Judgments in the Open Skies cases (e.g. Commission v. 
United Kingdom, C-466/98, EU:C:2002:624).
 (10) C. Hillion, “ERTA, ECHR and Open Skies : Laying the Grounds of the EU System 
of External Relations”, in M. poiares maDuro and L. Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future 
of EU Law : the Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty 
(Hart, 2010), 224, at 228.
 (11) Judgment in Kühne & Heitz, C-453/00, EU:C:2004:17.
 (12) Judgment in Winner Wetten, C-409/06, EU:C:2010:503, para. 66.
 (13) CJEU, joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. and M.E., EU:C:2011:865.
 (14) ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (Application no. 30696/09).
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that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception condi-
tions for asylum applicants in the Member State responsible”, (15) it may 
not transfer an asylum seeker to that Member State.
Fourth, the paper considers new limits to loyalty. With the exception of 
conferral, the principles described above primarily constrain loyalty where 
it threatens to affect individuals. As such, they do not provide effective 
boundaries to loyalty in the area of external relations. The paper examines 
to what extent additional limits can be found in (i) Article 4(2) TEU (respect 
for national and constitutional identity and, more generally, considerations 
of federalism), as well as in (ii) concerns of democratic accountability. As to 
(i) it is submitted that Article 4(2) is unlikely to lead to a sea change since 
the Court has consistently employed loyalty in the interest of the uniformity 
of EU law. However, Article 4(2) might provide the Court with a textual 
basis to make some of its implicit federalism-considerations more explicit, 
for instance with regard to the mutual recognition of same-sex marriages. 
With regard to (ii) it is pointed out that, especially in external relations, 
loyalty leads to a de facto transfer of power from the Member States to the 
Union (competence creep), which arguably should go hand in hand with 
a transfer of democratic accountability. The paper examines whether the 
involvement of the Council and the European Parliament provides sufficient 
guarantees in this respect.
 (15) N.S. and M.E., para. 94.
A PRINCIPLE IN NEED OF RENEWAL ? 
THE EURO-CRISIS AND THE PRINCIPLE 
OF INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE
By
Federico FABBRINI*
A central element of the constitutional architecture of the European 
Union (EU) is the principle of institutional balance. (1) The Court of Jus-
tice of the EU (CJEU) has recognized in its case law that the EU treaties 
set up a system for distributing powers among the different institutions, 
assigning to each of them a given role in the institutional structure of the 
EU and the accomplishment of specific tasks. (2) Hence, the CJEU ruled 
that “each of the institutions must exercise its powers with due regard for 
the powers of the other institutions.” (3) Moreover, the CJEU has derived 
from the principle of institutional balance an obligation to safeguard the 
constitutional prerogatives that each institution enjoys under the treaties 
against encroachments from other institutions, albeit subject to the principle 
of sincere cooperation. Hence, specifically protecting the European Parlia-
ment, the CJEU ruled that “the effective participation of the Parliament in 
the legislative process of the [EU] in accordance with the procedures laid 
down in the treaty, represents an essential factor in the institutional balance 
intended by the treaty.” (4)
The EU treaties, as revised at last by the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, have not 
explicitly codified the principle of institutional balance in EU primary law. 
Nevertheless, Article 13 TEU now proclaims that “[t]he Union shall have an 
institutional framework which shall aim to promote its values, advance its 
objectives, serve its interests, those of its citizens and those of the Member 
States, and ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its poli-
cies and actions,” and vests specific powers in each of the institutions it 
lists — suggesting that the EU constitutional architecture is conceived as a 
system of checks and balances, which cannot be altered or sidestepped at the 
 * PhD in Law from the European University Institute, Associate Professor of Euro-
pean & International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen. E-mail : federico.
fabbrini@jur.ku.dk.
 (1) See P. CraiG, “Institutions, Power and Institutional Balance”, in P. CraiG and G. De 
Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law 41, 2011.
 (2) See J.-P. Jacqué, The Principle of Institutional Balance, 41 Com Mkt. L.Rev. 
383, 2004.
 (3) Case C-70/88, Parliament v. Council [1990] ECR I-2067, para. 22.
 (4) Case C-65/93, Parliament v. Council [1995] ECR I-660, para. 21.
